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Why governments can’t reform anymore. A historical perspective.

By Andrew Kemp

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Total length: 8:31
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In one sentence

Governments increasingly cannot pursue major reform because authority has migrated from elected politicians to a dense network of professional, regulatory, legal, and consultative institutions. This “professionalised” state improves expertise and safeguards, but multiplies veto points, protects established interests, and makes decisive action politically and administratively difficult.

Overview

Kemp begins with Melbourne’s stalled Fishermans Bend redevelopment, using its layers of plans, approvals, agencies, and reviews as a concrete example of administrative paralysis. He connects this to Australia’s weak productivity and to international debates such as the American “Abundance” agenda. His historical explanation is that postwar prosperity and education expanded a professional, knowledge-based class. As this class gained political influence, government increasingly addressed problems through experts, regulations, rights, credentials, watchdogs, hearings, and independent bodies rather than through centralized political bargains. The result is a state with greater capacity and genuine welfare achievements, but less ability to make trade-offs or implement large projects. Kemp’s tentative remedy is political rather than technocratic: leaders must frame reform as a contest over values and reclaim rhetoric, authority, and responsibility.

Core ideas

Fishermans Bend as a model of institutional paralysis

A redevelopment announced in 2011 remained badly behind schedule fourteen years later. Kemp treats the project’s procedural complexity—not simply incompetence—as evidence of a state that has accumulated too many sequential approvals, documents, agencies, and conditions.

From class compromise to professional mediation

Earlier politics is portrayed as more centralized, organized around bargains between labour and capital. Modern government instead manages numerous stakeholders through professional expertise, consultation, regulation, and formal process. This makes decisions more inclusive but less direct.

The rise of the professional class

The expansion of universities, schooling, service employment, and knowledge work created a larger, wealthier, more educated professional class. Its preferences—environmental protection, safer and more attractive cities, equality, tolerance, and distrust of authority—helped reshape the state.

Expertise becomes political power

Professionals do not merely advise government; they help define what counts as a problem and which solutions are legitimate. Credentials, guidelines, modelling, impact assessments, and regulatory standards give expert groups influence while also reinforcing their occupational status.

Veto points and “kludgeocracy”

Safeguards created to prevent abuses—environmental, heritage, rights-based, and procedural—can combine into a system where many actors can delay or block action. Stephen Teles’s “kludgeocracy” captures government that is so complex it becomes costly and difficult even to understand.

The trade-off is real, not a simple decline

Kemp explicitly acknowledges substantial gains: longer lives, greater prosperity, more equality, improved safety, environmental protections, and less patriarchal social arrangements. The criticism is that the same institutional architecture now obstructs housing, service supply, infrastructure, and affordability.

Credentialism and rent-seeking

Professional licensing and qualification requirements can restrict entry and raise costs, particularly in care sectors. A growing compliance economy—lawyers, consultants, accountants, analysts, and similar roles—helps people navigate rules but may consume talent without proportionately increasing productive output.

Why reform has become harder

Power is dispersed among veto-groups whose interests are embedded in agencies, professions, and procedures. Elected officials have fewer direct levers and must overcome institutionalized interests, changing governments, media pressure, and the expectation that every issue deserves a new intervention.

Practical takeaways

Caveats and counterpoints

Questions worth revisiting

Return to this when…

Return to this note when thinking about housing delays, infrastructure overruns, productivity stagnation, credentialism, regulatory reform, or the tension between expert administration and democratic control. The Fishermans Bend example is the quickest reminder of the article’s central claim: a government can possess abundant expertise and still lack the ability to act.

References

  1. Original Why governments can’t reform anymore. A historical perspective.